in Chapter II, in which Kissinger diseusses\r\nNATO and missile defense. Kissinger\r\nis a dedicated "NATO forever" enthusiast\r\nand a firm proponent of the missile-defense\r\nsystem. I'o him, NATO "shll remains\r\nas an insurance policy against a\r\nnew Russian imperialism." It must not\r\nlose its sense of purpose and dissolve "into\r\na mnltilatcral mishmash"; if it did,\r\n"both Germany and Russia woidd be\r\ntempted to view each other as their best\r\nforeign policy option."\r\nSuch views are problematic bv Kissinger's\r\nown standards of America's\r\nnational interest: A hard-boiled realist\r\nshoidd have noted that missile defense\r\nhas prompted an ongoing improvement\r\nin Russo-Chinese relations. Ever fond of\r\nhistorical parallels, Kissinger ought to\r\nrecognize the similarity between the\r\nRussian-Chinese trcafv' of Jidy 2001 and\r\nthe entente cordiale between Great Britain\r\nand France of a century ago. That\r\narrangement also was not a formal alliance\r\nto start with, as the Germans consoled\r\nthemselves at the hme. Nevertheless,\r\nit did have a comparable underlying\r\nlogic in creahng a pattern of relations diat\r\nwas to become fullv apparent in August\r\n1914.\r\nBy refusing to acknowledge that NATO\r\nand missile defense will perpetuate\r\nan open-ended and inherendy adversarial\r\nrelationship between Washington and\r\nMoscow, Kissinger activates a predictable,\r\nand possibly intended, paradox.\r\nThe necessity to contain a potential\r\nthreat from...
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