Serbia Betrayed by Her Leaders
Talking to CKCU 93.1FM in Ottawa, Dr. Srdja Trifkovic considers the extraordinary readiness of the government in Belgrade to compromise Serbia’s national and state interests in order to demonstrate its subservience to the “international community.”
A recent batch of Wikileaks cables from the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade drastically illustrates the extent of institutionalized political corruption in Belgrade. Except for two opposition groups—the Democratic Party of Serbia of Vojislav Kostunica and the Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj—every other Serbian political party and almost every politician of note, including senior state officials, are revealed as seeking favors from the American Embassy. In return they provide privileged information, offered surreptitiously, in the form of confidential, off-the-record briefings. At times their behavior amounted to high treason, notably in early 2008 when classified contingency plans concerning Belgrade’s intended reaction to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence were disclosed to American diplomats in advance of the event itself. Some of these high-ranking officials—including advisors to the President of Serbia, Boris Tadic—have acted, literally, as unpaid agents of the U.S. intelligence.
Trifkovic says that the response of the government of Boris Tadic to the latest crisis in Kosovo defies rational analysis, but is not surprising in the light of Wikileaks revelations:
Three weeks ago the government of Serbia signed the so-called Customs Stamp Agreement and thus accepted in principle that the self-proclaimed authorities in Pristina have the authority to collect taxes and duties on goods entering Kosovo from Serbia-proper. This was a major act of surrender: for the first time Belgrade confirmed in a binding legal form that the Albanian authorities have the attributes of sovereign statehood and are accordingly authorized to take over the customs posts between Serbia and its separated southern province. In practice Belgrade has recognized Kosovo’s independence, the government’s feeble claims to the contrary notwithstanding. The tangible result on the ground came swiftly and predictably: the international authorities in Kosovo brought Albanian customs officers to the border crossings and thus separated the majority-Serb northern Kosovo from the rest of Serbia.
The Serbs in this northern triangle, in Northern Mitrovica, Leposavic, Zubin Potok, Zvecan, are resisting this fait accompli because they see it as a key step in the process that would lead to their eventual expulsion, just as most Serbs south of the Ibar River have been expelled. They have put up barricades to prevent traffic from the border crossings reaching the rest of the Province. By doing so, however, they have hemmed themselves in. The supplies from Serbia are essential to their survival, but those supplies are not getting through. They are running short of fuel, food and other essential ingredients of everyday life. There have been clashes with KFOR at one of the crossings, but on the whole the international powers-that-be are letting the Serbs go on with the blockade knowing that in the fullness of time they will have to come to terms, especially since they have no support from Belgrade. If they did have support from Belgrade it would be possible to improvise alternative crossings on local roads that are not under the control of either KFOR or the Albanian authorities. Without Belgrade’s wholehearted support this is not a viable option.
Asked about the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), Trifkovic says that both bodies have been actively aiding and abetting the Albanian authorities’ bid for full control over the Province:
EULEX is a mission with an entirely self-generated mandate. Incongruously, it is a “rule of law” mission which has no legal basis whatsoever. Its existence is not provided for by the UNSC Resolution 1244. The only reason it exists is that the EU wanted to invent a role for itself, to marginalize the UN, and bypass the Security Council in applying the Ahtisaari Plan. This role—as could have been predicted with mathematical certainty—proved detrimental to the interests of the Serbs. Nevertheless, the “pro-Western” Serbian coalition government formed after the election of 11 May 2008 accepted EULEX in December of that same year. Moscow was not happy to see this new body entrenched in Kosovo, but Belgrade asked it not to interfere.
As for the nominal UN force, KFOR, it is exclusively a NATO operation. It is unfortunate that it no longer includes a Russian contingent. All of the key KFOR components are provided by NATO powers, which act under the political guidelines from Brussels and from their national governments. They actively support the Albanian authorities and invariably act in a manner detrimental to Serb interests. The remaining Serbs in Kosovo are subsequently squeezed between the Internationals’ hammer and the Albanian anvil, with the government in Belgrade slinking to the sidelines and selling them down the river.
Asked about the notable lack of public support for the Kosovo Serbs by the institutions in Serbia, Trifkovic gave a gloomy assessment:
What institutions? The Royal House has faded from public view and many Serbs no longer see it as a relevant factor. Once enormously influential, the Academy of Sciences and Arts is in a state of suspended hibernation—it is clinically dead, even though the doctor has not made the pronouncement as yet. The Army of Serbia exists by now merely as an operatic guard of honor, to provide the airport decorum for President Tadic’s toing and froing. It is no longer capable of even contemplating its primary mission, armed defense of the homeland against aggression, let alone executing it.
As for the Serbian Orthodox Church, it cannot do much under the circumstances. Unless the Church acts in accord with the secular authority—and the government of Serbia is evidently in the hands of people who are compromising its state and national interests—the Church is unable to exert great influence by virtue of its moral authority alone. The Orthodox concept of the role of the Church in a society is that it should act in symphony, the Byzantine term for harmony, with the secular authorities. When there is the State on one hand and the Church on the other pursuing the same set of objectives—the material and spiritual welfare, security and prosperity of a nation—then the role of the Church can be articulated in the right manner. When the two centers of gravity diverge, the Church either has to adjust to the course of events dictated by the secular authorities—as it is somewhat reluctantly doing now—or else it can try to deviate from that course, defy the authorities, and risk being marginalized the way the former Bishop of Kosovo, Artemije, has been pushed to the margins over the past year.
At the moment there is no future for the Serbs in Kosovo. What can bring different dynamics into the equation is an overall change in the global distribution of power, above all the ongoing gradual decline of the influence of the United States. We are looking at a race between the decline of Serbia locally and the decline of the U.S. globally. I suspect that Serbia may collapse well before the decline of the American global influence makes it possible for the Serbs to contemplate different outcomes and develop new strategic designs for the recovery of what has been lost over the past two decades.
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I respect Dr. Trifkovic's assessments of the situation in Europe, but I remain confused as relates to this and his previously posted essay regarding the Russian leadership. Here is what confuses me:
1. What could the Serbian leadership in Belgrade do differently to preserve Kosovo in the face of overwhelming force that its foes have demonstrated ready willingness to use against the Serbian nation?
2. What has or would Russia do to tangibly help the Serbs preserve Kosovo? And thereby preserve Russian interests and credibility?
Being of Serbian ethnicity and concerned for the preservation of my ancestral homeland, I share Dr. Trifkovic's frustrations with the situation. I also share his opinion that Dr. Kostunica is the best and most capable leader in Serbia and I'd rather that his Democratic Party of Serbia were making the decisions in Belgrade. But I cannot see how much difference it would necessarily make.
Serbia has no powerful patrons to protect her. In a world where the Grand Strategy plays out, no small state can effectively function without an accomodating powerful state behind her. Serbia finds herself precisely in that position: unwilling to capitulate to a resurgent neo-Ottoman Turkey, unable to curry favor with a Germany that has always despised her, and unable to get anything more than moral support from Russia. And betrayed by her traditional allies in Washington.
Many Serbs will argue that Russia is there for the Serbs and I would ask them precisely how, when, and where? Surely not in the spring of 1999 when Serbia was terror-bombed into relinquishing her province? Even after the Russian Army - perhaps acting independently of Moscow - had secured the airport in Pristina and effectively secured the province from NATO invasion, the Kremlin ordered the troops out.
I understand that it was the Yelstin regime at the time and everything is supposed to be different now with Putin. But I'll ask again, beyond more strongly worded diplomatic support, how so?
I'd agree with Dr. Trifkovic that Medvedev and Putin are better diplomats and willing to take necessary steps toward the modernization of Russia in a way that authorities in Minsk stubbornly refuse to do so, but I'll remind Dr. Trifkovic that it was Belarussian president Aleksandar Lukashenko that braved the no-fly zone over Serbia in the spring of 1999 to fly into Belgrade in a show of support. (As I recall, only one other significant foreign party made the same brave gesture, the leadership of France's National Front.)
It's one thing for Russian leaders to call for a greater showing of Serbian backbone but an altogether different thing to actually provide help. What might help look like to a Serbia that would take steps to preserve Kosovo? Perhaps a publicly made economic commitment of financial grants and free energy shipments to weather sanctions which could devastate an already impoverished Serbia. Perhaps a delivery of free - not sold, free - state of the art military technology to Serbia. If Moscow were very emboldened, it could come in the form of a threat to Germany to shut off energy supplies that they and the wider EU are very dependent on Russia for and instead send them eastward to a China that would gladly purchase them. If further emboldened, a Russian carrier fleet might suddenly show up in the seas off the Balkan penninsula to begin drills. Real support is not all that difficult to contemplate but remains scarce.
Absent real support from a powerful country like Russia, Serbia is in no position to take any action against western powers hell bent on destroying her. The best she can hope for is mere survival as she is reduced to grovelling for mercy which she apparently will not receive, certainly not from Wermacht troops who are for the third time in the past century shooting un-armed Serbian farmers.
I say this with the greatest respect for my friend Srdja, but I think he may be overstating the demerits of the Tadic regime, whose engagement with western diplomats smacks more of desperation than treason, and overstating the merits, capabilities, and intentions of the Putin regime whose inaction betrays a Russian elite that, while seemingly having its heart in the right place, remains very unsure of itelf.
Serbia is a victim of European civilizational decline that stems from the rejection of Christianity and manifests itself in a ruinous loss of confidence and collapse of both rational and moral thinking. The problem is more acute for Serbia than it is for most other European countries because she lacks a sizable patron while she finds herself on civilizational faultlines which are quaking.
From James Jatras: When all is said and done, the problem is in Belgrade. Until that is solved, nothing will be solved, and things will continue to get worse.
The ruling coalition is trying let NATO smother the Serbs of Mitrovica with as little bother or attention as possible. After that, as they see it, it's endgame, "Kosova" is a fait accompli, and "Gee, we did everything we could to save Kosovo. But at least our path to EU is unobstructed!"
As for the Russians, yes, there are issues. But the bottom line is that they're fairly begging Serbia to defend herself and offering backup. One can quibble with their motivations, or if they should be doing this, not that. Keep in mind that their credibility is limited when they are defending a government that would rather buddy up with the countries committing aggression against it than its No. 1 defender. But with V.V. Putin set to return to the presidency, and someone like D.O. Rogozin at NATO HQ, I have no doubt there are Russians who understand that US/EU/NATO violations of UNSCR 1244 are a threat to Russia's standing as a Permanent Member of the UNSC, which is a big deal for them. I think whatever illusions the Russians had (and I think some did) about the Tadic regime are gone. The Russians will continue to be more Serbian than these "Serbs," but that only can do so much.
As far as the US and the EU, we have to keep slugging but at this point it's hard to see any turnaround until we get a better government in Brussels. Keep in mind that from Day One, the well was poisoned here. IMHO, the only way to turn around western policy is first to stall it. Indeed, it did stall from mid-to-late 2006 (our geniuses in Washington had intended to "finalize" Kosovo's status by the end of 2006) based on miscalculations about whether Moscow would fold (to the utter surprise of all the bad people here, they didn't) and that they could bully the (then) DSS-led government (even then weakened by its coalition with DS) into submission.
It took Tadic's election victory in Feb 2008 for Washington to decide is was finally time to pull the trigger on telling the murderers in Pristina to proceed with the UDI. Then, with the election of the Yellow Coalition in the Serbian parliamentary vote in May 2008, western policy felt confident it could proceed as it pleased to build "credibilty" for the fraudulent so-called "independent state," even though the pace of recongintions was and still is frustratingly (for them) slow, and the majority of the world community remained (and remains) on Serbia's side.
Most importantly, the west could -- and as the hoped-for endgame approaches, still can -- proceed with confidence that Tadic and Co will do nothing to obstruct "progress," slow as it may be, toward the intended goal and indeed would even help things along. Perhaps the clearest indication of this was about a year ago, in Sept 2010, when Belgrade decided against introducing an anti-secessonism resolution in the UN General Assembly -- which would have been backed by Russia, China, India, etc, in fact most countries with secessionist movements, and which would have passed with a good margin, I believe -- and instead introduced a "compromise" (with whom? -- with the aggressor states) text, drafted in cooperation with the US and EU (http://www.rferl.org/content/UNGA_Passes_Kosovo_Resolution/2153707.html), that called for technical negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo, as if they already were two independent and equal states.
The real bad news is twofold: First, any prospect of getting rid of the current coaltion is at best problematic in any foreseeable election scenario. Second, the opposition parties are either of limited effectiveness or themselves are playing ball with the western powers. A large part of even the patriotic Serbian public (which I believe is still a majority) has been demoralized and, one senses, anesthetized into hopelessness by the current regime. And you can bet that in the approaching parliamentary elections the US and EU will pour every dollar/euro needed and employ every "political technology" trick in the book to ensure a "pro-western, democratic" government stays in place, either as now consituted or reshuffled with other parties under reliable control.
So, the problem remains: can Serbia get a government that is on Serbia's side? (http://www.savekosovo.org/?p=9&sp=572) I'm not saying that can't happen, I just don't see how it does in the immediate future, given the political circumstances there. The frustrating thing is that the situation in KiM and internationally is far from hopeless, if there were a government Belgrade willing to defend energentically Serbia's interests.
I respect Jim Jatras' convictions and his dedicated support for Serbia, but in his opinion as quoted and in Dr. Trifkovic's response we learn not what the answer is to my two basic queries?
What specifically should Belgrade do differently right now and what has Russia offered as help should trouble arise out of such new courses of action? And absent tangible assistance from a nuclear - economic power like Russia, what courses of action are open to Serbia strategically?
Tadic and company may be bumbling idiots, may be corrupt, and may be traitors - though no proof positive has arisen to the latter claim. Should they have accepted the customs stamps, should they have backed off in the UN - I concur with you, they should not have done so in either case.
Should alternate roads and hill country be used to feed and supply the Serbs in northern Kosovo, yes, and I suspect this is happening without the Serbian authorities impeding it. They're likely aiding it. That's why Belgrade continues to be attacked for maintaining "parallel institutions". But, however crucial at any given moment, these are small tactical steps. Strategically, Serbia remains stymied and would be under any regime, even the one more preferable to us both.
As to the Russian NATO ambassador, I watched Dmitry Rogozin's response to the German violence being unleashed on Serbs this week. He analyzed the situation very well: NATO countries were destablizing the Balkans yet again, Serbs had done nothing to provoke this, a continued dialogue over unilateral moves is preferable, etc...but in all that I heard not one word about what Russia's response might be. In fact, when we speak about demoralization, I found both Mr. Rogozin's comments and demeanor on the RT interview extremely demoralizing:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26nnAGajYxg
Here are some basic facts which are essential to the discussion at hand:
* Serbia's largest trading partner - the EU.
* Serbia's largest source of foreign direct investment - the EU.
* Serbia's largest, and nearly only, source of financial grants for infrastructural modernization - the EU.
* Serbia's largest source of full scholarships for its students to attend top universities abroad - England.
* Serbia's largest source of tourist visitors - the EU.
* Serbia's source of large financial loans - the IMF and other western institutions.
Put in the context of the above, the Tadic regime's obsequious behavior to Brussels at least makes some sense. The bottom line is that Serbia is very reliant on western Europe for its survival. Of course it has to grovel for acceptance into the club, what alternate course do the facts suggest is realistically possible?
Russia with its defunct industrial base and largely one dimensional economy is likely in no position to step in and fill the economic void should some of the above facts change or become unviable for Serbia, so perhaps I cannot necessarily expect that of Moscow. But then perhaps the problem is more structural and less behavioral in that regardless of Belgrade's and Moscow's behaviors they have little power (economic which begets military which begets political) to act in a manner that we would wish for.
And I don't mean to give the impression to readers here that this is about the Serbian public's greed, this is about the most basic material needs. We're not talking about luxury, but survival.
It's not the first time European civilization has turned on itself, but it may be the last, and not in the good sense. I hope that the economic turmoil will soon spell the end of the EU. That will pave the way for a more multi-polar Europe which, dangerous though it's proven to be, may well save Serbia before the current batch of anti-Christian zealots destroy her.
Eagle: All of the above is the opinion of Jim Jatras, I haven't given "my response" as yet. It is as follows: The way in which Kostunica (with all his shortcomings) had managed to create difficulties for the U.S.-led completion of the "unfinished business in the Balkans" prior to June 2008 indicates that the range of available options was available back then and has been available since to those willing to use it. Specifically, saying no to Eulex, a perfidious and utterly illegal invention designed to circumvent 1244, offers a prime example. The lobotomic slogan "Europe Has No Alternative" has resulted in a series of self-inflicted wounds by virtue of limiting the range of feasible options which no rational decision-maker should ever deny himself upfront and without any compensation. And Wikileaks provide proof positive that they ARE a bunch of traitors... but their fruits had proven that much long ago.
Dr. Trifkovic, by your logic I would place the blame for the 2004 Albanian-led pogrom against Serbs in Kosovo and the UN's refusal to respond to it squarely on Dr. Kostunica's shoulders. It did happen just after the conclusion of his presidency and during his leadership of the governmental cabinet. Would that then be a just and realistic assessment of Prime Minister Kostunica's performance and a sign of his less than patriotic ambitions?
Of course, I don't believe so because like the events that unfolded in 2008 it was largely, if not entirely, beyond his capability to control.
Saying no to EULEX amounts to a game of semantics that is meaningless. Whether the German and American troops in Kosovo operate under the banner of the UN or EU has proven to be irrelevant as concerns preserving Serbian sovereignty, property, or lives. While it may matter to legal theoreticians to some small degree, the rule of law has proven to matter not at all in the context of the Yugoslav dissolution. UNMIK was in place when the Athassari plan was acted on and unilateral secession executed and Russian opposition mattered not one bit in the UN, months before EULEX was created.
While the Serbian government should refrain from contextualizing their pursuit of EU favors and membership as being the "only option", the facts I've laid out in comment #3 spell out a reality as regards the EU's importance to Serbian survival. At the same time, it must be recognized that the government has been entirely respectful and deferrential to the Russian and Chinese regimes, stating forthrightly that partnerships with the two is of paramount importance. No less so than regards any western countries. I fail to see when or how the current authorities have snubbed anyone or dismissed the possible range of options?
And while, like you, I prefer the opposition to Tadic's regime, I do believe we have to be careful in using the label of traitor. The Wikileaks no where as far as I have read present a definitive case of treason. We know not in any given situation whether the sharing of information was not an engineered ruse to convince Americans they were receiving confidential information that was in fact all along planned to be packaged and shared in a certain way. Clandestine meetings prove little as well. You and I may both suspect that Kosovo means less to those with red lineage's - such as Tadic and Dacic have - than to you or me but such indifference does not in and of itself rise to the charge of treason. You have read the leaks far more extensively and if you can share where the treason stands out, then I would change my stance on the matter.
We have to be both realistic and prudent in exhorting either the Belgrade government or the Serbian public in responding to the provocations in Kosovo. The wrong move may well lead to the complete and immediate collapse of Serbia in a manner that would be far more detrimental than the current course. Based on the events that have unfolded these past twenty years, and even these past two weeks, I am wary that unilateral Serbian military action would likely lead to the same tragic course of events as those of 1941.
I just don't see what tricks Belgrade could pull and I don't read in your response any suggestions that would be worth pursuing. Mr. Jatras' claim that Russia would be there with "back up" not withstanding, Russian inaction these past twenty years would suggest we have little to depend on in that quarter. Moscow could, of course, change that course by implementing any one of the suggestions in my first comment. Serbian inaction in the wake of such tangible backing would then be inexcusable. But I fear the Russians are in no position to do so and either themselves lack the confidence to stand up to the west's bullying or fear a greater calamity if they were to react. It's not entirely clear.
What is clear is that our enmity should be focused on the chief culprits in this scandalous affair, namely on the powers that act out of Washington and Berlin. There is clearly no unity within the EU as regards Kosovo. French and Italian troops, often used to protect Serbian monasteries, are not used in the contested zone and Bucharest announced this week that it is withdrawing the Romanian police mission from Kosovo. A reaction within the EU that serves as a counter-balance to murderous Berlin may well be the best hope. It is as yet unclear whether the economic crisis makes that more or less plausible. But I personally believe the foreign ministry needs to try its best with sympathetic capitals in the west. Even if it means a small victory of replacing German troops in the north with Italian ones, as they would be less prone to shoot Serbs.
With that, I'll end by apologizing for three rather long responses. They are offered respectfully and in the best hope that we can discuss with candor the situation that has unfolded. I have the utmost respect both for you and Mr. Jatras, and like you both I am partial to Dr. Kostunica and the DSS, but we happen to disagree on what may or may not be possible as regards Kosovo.
Vojislav Kostunica
Not being corrupt is not enough
We tried to send him the text of the Law on Rehabilitation of Victims of Communist Terror to place it on agenda of parllament, He did not respond.
The Law have written Ptijezda Popoic, attorney at law, professor
Dr. Vitanovic and Ljubinko Jovicic B.A.
Who is Who in Belgrade is impossile to read. The picture is difuse. There is a croud of Janus-headed guys running down the road. Brilliant in a field, dudes in other