The State of the Game: The U.S., Russia, and the South Ossetian Conflict
As of Saturday, 16 August, both the Russian and Georgian sides of the conflict over the “unrecognized republics” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had signed a six-point cease-fire agreement stipulating that Georgian forces must move back to their bases, while Russian troops are supposed to draw back to pre-conflict positions. The agreement does, however, leave the Russians some room to take additional “security measures” and reports continue to come in of Russian troops moving closer to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. Russian forces have been destroying Georgian military installations and equipment as well.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration has continued to call for the complete withdrawal of Russian forces, while Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev has hinted that Moscow will not stop short of recognizing the independence of the disputed regions (Medvedev said that after the recent events “it's unlikely Ossetians and Abkhazians will ever be able to live together with Georgia in one state"). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has been more blunt, reportedly telling U.S. Secretary of State Rice that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili must go and that the West can “forget about” Georgia’s territorial integrity. The White House has used the crisis to clinch a deal with Poland on deploying anti-missile defense systems there, reportedly including Patriot-2 interceptor systems. The Russians have responded by warning that this could make Poland a target (Colonel General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the Russian general staff, warned that Poland is “exposing itself to a strike”). According to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the deal also includes a clause about a “mutual commitment” between the two countries to come to one another’s assistance “in case of trouble,” a clear reference to Russia. So Washington may be concluding a mutual defense pact with Poland, which, like other Eastern European states and former Soviet republics, is nervously watching the events unfold in Georgia.
Judging by the reaction of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who has issued an order that Russian warships must give notice before entering Ukrainian waters, Kiev is nervous about Moscow using a territorial dispute--in this case, over the Crimea--as a pretext for a move against Ukraine. The Russians have an agreement on keeping the Black Sea fleet at its historic base at the Crimean port of Sevastopol through 2017, and Russian officials have already said that the fleet will ignore Yushchenko’s order, which could open the door to a Russia-Ukraine confrontation. Moscow has mounted a media campaign partly blaming Kiev for the South Ossetian crisis, since Ukraine, along with the United States, other NATO member countries, and Israel, has been supplying arms to the Georgian army. The United States and Israel have trained the Georgian army and Saakashvili has counted on both U.S. and Israeli support, while Moscow contends that Kiev was encouraging the Georgians to launch an attack on South Ossetia, but the finger pointing doesn’t stop there.
In the United States, presidential candidate John McCain has blasted the Russians and pushed for Georgian NATO membership. "NATO's decision to withhold a Membership Action Plan [MAP] for Georgia might have been viewed as a green light by Russia for its attacks on Georgia, and I urge the NATO allies to revisit the decision," McCain said (Saakashvili also makes the same claim--he wanted to move forward with a MAP in April). Russia’s Izvestiya on 13 August blamed American neo-conservatives for Georgia’s moves on South Ossetia, with Vice President Cheney and McCain playing the main roles in the plot to “whip up anti-Russian hysteria” and help McCain win the November election. For his part, Barrack Obama has also endorsed continuing the process of bringing Georgia into NATO.
To recap, as of 16 August, the United States and Russia have moved closer to confrontation resulting from a series of events over a number of years, including continued NATO expansion, Western support for the independence of Kosovo (The Russian argument has been that Kosovo has set a precedent--how are Kosovo and South Ossetia different?), and agreements on deploying U.S. anti-missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, while Russia is moving to re-assert its power in the former Soviet Union. The crisis over the “unrecognized” republics in Georgia has intensified the frictions and cooled Russian relations with the West, but especially with the United States, even further. U.S. media and the blogosphere’s reporting on the turn of events in Georgia has tended to be partisan, one side warning of a resurgent Russia as a security threat, the other endorsing Russian resistance to NATO expansion. One side tends to see the Russians as the culprits; the other is closer to the Russian position, blaming Washington. In view of the stakes, a more dispassionate review of the interests of the key players and the machinations behind the conflict in Georgia might give readers a chance to decide for themselves where U.S. interests lie and who is to blame.
Neoconservatives have been conspicuously anti-Russian (see my article in the July issue of Chronicles), but Washington sources say that Saakashvili was repeatedly warned not to use military force to resolve the dispute over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Briefly, both territories want independence from Georgia, if not incorporation into the Russian Federation. Moscow took a hand in the 90’s to insert itself into the dispute as a peacekeeping force. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has continued to press for NATO expansion eastward as the Warsaw Pact broke up, deepening ties with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and former Warsaw Pact member states, as well as establishing ties with former Soviet Central Asian republics. The United States, the EU, and major Western energy companies are very interested in undermining Russia’s position as near monopolist on oil and natural gas pipeline routes to the West. Georgia has been an alternative route for oil from the Caspian basin. NATO membership would have solidified the alternative route via a NATO security guarantee and somewhat weakened Moscow’s ability to use energy as a card in political and diplomatic frictions with the West.
In Tbilisi, Saakashvili has been frustrated by the reluctance of some NATO members to fast track Georgian membership. Two points have especially blocked the fast track Saakashvili has eyed: First, the territorial disputes and the presence of Russian troops in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and second, Saakashvili’s strong arm repression of internal opposition. Saakashvili may have been banking on the second merely being an excuse--it was the lack of willingness by some Western European powers to confront Russia that was the real reason for stalling on Georgian NATO membership.
Georgia was set to press forward on a Membership Action Plan at the December NATO meeting. Meanwhile, Russia was strengthening its troop contingent in South Ossetia. George Bush, who has been Saakashvili’s close ally, is set to leave office in November and Tbilisi could not be sure of how the elections would turn out or what a new president, especially Obama, might do. Saakashvili appears to have been counting on strong U.S. support. Once Georgian troops moved into South Ossetia at the end of the first week in August and Russia reacted with more troops, armor, and air power, Saakashvili seemed to plead for U.S. backing, saying that “it’s not about Georgia any more…It’s about America, it’s about values. We are a freedom-loving nation that is right now under attack.” As noted above, since then Saakashvili has bitterly blamed NATO reluctance to take in Georgia as the reason for Russian intervention. Saakashvili probably hoped for a strong Western response, winning a media campaign that would cast Russia as the aggressor, and the West pressing for the Russians to leave the disputed territories, replaced by international peacekeepers (which the six-point cease-fire could open the door to, at least theoretically). Then the case for NATO membership would be boosted, while Saakashvili could consolidate his position domestically as the national leader engaged in a struggle with the Russian aggressor.
Russia’s rapid response suggests that Moscow had planned the Georgia intervention ahead of time. Moscow military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer has claimed that Moscow began planning an assault in April, when a frustrated Vladimir Putin attended a NATO meeting in Brussels and it became apparent that in spite of Russian warnings, the West would eventually move forward with NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. More sharply-worded Russian warnings followed, but the United States continued to forge ahead with the expansion plan and with agreements on deploying missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, which Moscow sees as part of a plan to encircle Russia. Russian units in the guise of peacekeepers were moved into Abkhazia, and the boosting of the Russian contingent in South Ossetia was on track. According to Felgenhauer, the plan evolved toward war aiming to exclude Georgians from both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, remove Saakashvili, and prevent Georgia’s inclusion in NATO. In principal, Moscow was prepared to recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity, in return for the country’s transformation into a confederacy and elections that would chose a Georgia president to Moscow’s liking.
The Jamestown Foundation’s Vladimir Socor has written that Moscow staged a series of provocations to bait Saakashvili, including the 3 July attempted assassination of Dmitry Sanakoyev, head of the Tbilisi-backed interim administration of South Ossetia. Russian warplanes began flights over Georgian territory, partly to deter reconnaissance missions by Georgian drone aircraft, obscuring the Russian preparations for conflict in South Ossetia (there were several incidents involving Russian warplanes and Georgian drone aircraft dating back to March). Roadside bomb attacks were aimed at Georgian police in the disputed region and Ossetian troops fired at Georgian-populated villages in the region, stepping up the attacks at the end of July and early August. Moscow, according to Socor, was aiming at blocking Georgia’s entry into NATO by frightening the Western powers with a possible confrontation. As related by Socor, the series of events leading up to Russian intervention closely resembled that of incidents in the disputed Trans-Dniester region of Moldova, as well as in Abkhazia, in the 90’s.
In the corridors of Russian power, the “clan” machinations were in full swing. According to sources in Moscow, the “siloviky” wing of the Russian elite--a group of former and serving security and police officials who have personal ties to Premier Putin--saw the war as a chance to shift the balance of power in their favor and undermine efforts by their apparatus opponents (“liberals”) to use President Medvedev as a lever in their battle with the siloviky. For months, the talk in Moscow has been of a possible “thaw” in Moscow--and the purge of the “siloviky.” Both sides in the battle have attempted to drive a wedge between the members of the Medvedev-Putin “tandem” and secure the ouster of their enemies. This does not mean that the liberals are doves. What seems to be happening in the aftermath of the Russian intervention is an attempt by one side to capitalize on war to boost siloviky influence and prevent their being purged, while the liberals hope to use the six-point plan to mend fences with the West and halt the siloviky ascendance. Both sides are intimately connected to Russia’s oil and natural gas companies, especially gas monopoly Gazprom and oil major Rosneft, as are both Medvedev and Putin. Oil, gas, and pipeline politics, as well as the material interests of influential people in the West, play a role in the West’s interference in Georgia. The material interests of Russia’s billionaire bureaucrats are even more at stake. Losing the political battle means losing access to Russia’s assets--and it could mean prison or worse.
Meanwhile, in South Ossetia, Russian sources say regional boss Eduard Kokoyty is using anti-looting measures (looters are to be shot) as a cover to move against his political opponents. Kokoyty is the reputed boss of smuggling operations in the region, has been the beneficiary of Moscow’s money, and he does not intend to give up that position.
The picture of what is happening in Georgia and the machinations that may have taken place in Washington, Moscow, and Tbilisi in recent months remains obscure, but a close look at the available evidence suggests that there may be parties in each capital who might benefit from an aggressive stance. The game of bluff, saber rattling, and political maneuvering has resulted in a conflict that potentially could pit the Western powers--or perhaps the United States alone--against Russia. In the West, some see Russia as an aggressive threat that must be stopped, or at least as a rival for controlling energy export routes from Eurasia. In Tbilisi, the Georgians have counted on playing Washington against Moscow in a desperate and risky game. In Moscow and Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, political power, national pride, and the personal and material interests of ruling clans are driving events. The last thing that seems to be of any real concern is the ordinary people who are caught in the crossfire. Great powers have played such games before, stumbling into war.
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A very sober and sobering analysis.
Garbage.
The Jamestown Foundation is a biased propagandist front its director is Glen Howard who lobbies and runs pro Chechen websites for god sakes.
That’s as reliable as an AEI scholars writing about the Israel/Palestine conflict.
Ukraine shipped in foreign mercs during the assault to capture Abkhazia.
Georgian forces and affiliated foreign mercs have repeatedly violated the peace keeping agreement by entering regions.
Are the villages unarmed?
Did they fire and provoke a response from the regions forces?
Is there proof of this happening?
These reports are probably as credible as Gori being in ruins.
I know Paul Craig Roberts is not a foreign policy specialist, but according to him, he has looked closely at this situation and has concluded that the U.S. and Israel had been planning this confrontation for months. Even the Israeli media is reporting that Israel has been supplying Georgia with significant military aid and advisors for many months now. Given those facts, how can you argue with Roberts' claim?
The great tragedy is not so much one of Georgians trying to remember who they once were or currently are as Russians however loosely one wishes to apply the term being condemned by history to fruitlessly wrestle the same problem for ever.
To those of you who seem to think I'm taking one side or another in this as far as who is responsible for starting the conflict, please read the article carefully again. None of us can be completely sure, but I wrote that there is evidence suggesting there are parties in the US, Georgia, and Russia who might have favored an aggressive stand on this issue. I did note Georgia's ties to Israel. One point that I hope readers draw from this is how complex situations like those in SOssetia and Abkhazia could spin out of control and how dangerous great power gamesmanship can be. I think Chronicles readers know where I and the other editors are on US foreign policy. Instead of more polemics and name-calling, I had had hoped to offer a different approach this time out.
Wayne,
Any additional information is much appreciated. Although James can always be counted on for aggressive polemics, he did bring something to the table by pointing out possible bias in the Jamestown Foundation.
Would we not be obligated to go to war with Russia if Georgia was a member of NATO? Do we have the means to do so? Would it be a "limited" war or "total' war? Do the pro NATO expansionists in the US expect the other western NATO members to step up and do their share? What did the US think would happen when we supported Kosovo independence? Are our leaders idiots?
Putin and his gang may be bad guys, but are also tough guys and apparently not as stupid as our guys.
I'll bet I know who paid for all that Georgian military equipment being destroyed----us.
#7 - You've got that right and we'll pay to replace it. The US has given Georgia a billion dollars worth of military aid. That's peanuts compared to what we give to such "allies" as Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan, but as the late Senator Everett Dirksen put it, "You take a billion here and a billion there and pretty soon you're talking about real money."
Regarding the cited Felgenhauer and Socor;
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/71571
Over the course of time, they've had a clear slant running against mainstream Russian views. Like all of us, their views should come under scrutiny.
I came across comments from George Friedman offering a somewhat different take than Felgenhauer and Socor.
One must consider what constitutes a "provocation." Like the Georgian troop buildup that comes close to the South Ossetian border, followed by back and forth claims of increased gunfire between the combatants. In the background, are the provocative comments by key Georgian officials about retaking South Ossetia. Also, as the Georgian army withdrew from South Ossetia, the former claimed a strategic retreat. Does that not invite the idea of taking out as much as possible its capability to re-launch a similar strike in the future?
Much paleoconservative commentary has been restricted to condemnations of neoconservative hypocrisy ("apply the Kosovo precedent to South Ossetia") and overreaching ("don't encircle Russia, you Russophobes!"). I have not seen much that attempts to "read" the events in Georgia without anti-neocon glasses. Here's what I mean: the neocons view the event with tainted glasses. Georgia apparently has entered into a strategic relationship with the United States and Israel, and the current leaders there wish to join NATO. So the neocons support Georgia against Putin's Russia, a regime they dislike. But the paleconservative commentators basically oppose Georgia's move and support Russia on the same criteria. Well, the rightness or wrongness of Georgia's attempt to reassert sovereignty in a renegade province and of Russia's intrusion into sovereign Georgian territory does not depend upon the consistency or purity of neoconservative views on the matter. If neocons are hypocrites for not supporting South Ossetian secessionism after they supported Kosovar secessionism, what of paleocons who condemn the Georgian leaders for trying to regain territory that had been theirs for centuries after those same paleocons defended the Serbian thrust into Kosovo on the same grounds? Why are claims about Georgian atrocities believed immediately when some paleoconservative publications rehash every claim about Serbian atrocities, even years later?
Also, some critics of Georgia fall back on the "it's all about oil" argument, as though that in and of itself were sufficient to render American pro-Georgian sentiment evil. If it really were all about oil, then we would be speaking about something that goes to American interests at least. Russia has strategically backed Iran against threats of attack, and is in a security deal with China. The Russians influence Europe by threatening to cut off the fuel supply. If the Europeans attempted to build pipelines that bypassed Russia, who could blame them? If Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics bought into the deal, who could blame them? If Russia objected, who could blame them, BUT -- if "it's all about oil" is an indictment of American intervention in Georgia, it should be an indictment of Russian intervention as well. IF Russia is trying to keep its oil and natural gas monopolies by thwarting plans for pipelines *outside Russian territory,* then yes, the Russians are being aggressive.
I keep getting the sense that paleoconservative views are reductive and derivative -- "wait and see what the neocons say, then vociferously rebuke them." What would you say about the conflict in South Ossetia if you had no clue which side was pro-Western, pro-NATO, pro-American, or pro-Israeli, or which side the neocons defended?
#11 - I don't think it is a question of who is right and who is wrong in this conflict, as if Americans of any variety are qualified to figure that out. I know of not one person who has advocated going to the aid of Russia, but many have advocated going to the aid of Georgia. McCain ("we are all Georgians") is one conspicuous example. This dust-up is quite simply none of our business. Neither was Kosovo. The US government should not be presuming to micro-manage the world. That is the bottom line. Let the nations and peoples immediately involved sort this out for themselves.
I included the comments by Felgenhauer and Socor because I thought them credible in view of what I have seen myself watching the events unfold for months now. I also included a qoute from Izvestiya for the same reason, though it is hardly an unbiased source, since it is owned by people who have made billions through friendship with Putin and Medvedev. But I included the quote since there might be something to it, it added to the picture, and seemed to fit. There aren't any unbiased sources. One has to watch something as closely as possible and make a judgement on whether something is worth considering. I thought I had also made it clear that Saakashvili was desperate and could easily have done all he could to get something started. He has a reputation for being impulsive and hot-headed.
All of us operate off what we think we know. A lot remains very unclear about what happened. The one thing that does seem clear is that the countries involved in this might easily stumble into something they did not anticipate--I hope the dangerous situation might wake up some people over here and make us realize that risking war over something like this is crazy. I doubt it, but we can hope.
Thanks to all the thoughtful commentators. Back to Russia watching. Lots going on.
"I know of not one person who has advocated going to the aid of Russia,"
Thank you, Mr. Higdon for your comments. I *have* seen a number of paleoconservatives blame Georgia for the fiasco and laud Putin. If it is "none of our interest" even to determine who is right, then rooting for the guy the neoconservatives are not rooting for is uncalled for.
The Ossetians have lived in South Ossetia for centuries, and it was part of Russia until Stalin cut it off and made it part of Georgia. Likewise, the Abkhaz are native to their soil. Therefore, no one can claim that the situation in South Ossetia is the same as that of Kosovo, which was stolen by immigrant invaders who ran the natives out of their own land. The two situations are not analogous, and it is wrong to accuse 'paleocons' of hypocrisy. Both Russia and plaeocons are right to support the Serbs with regard to Kosovo, and 'paleocons' would be right to support Russia in preventing the invasion, and if it was taking place, the ethnic cleansing of South Ossetia by Georgia. After all, if the Ossetians want independence or to rejoin Russia, why not let them? It's their land, and arguments about 'territorial integrity' are excuses for the subjugation of peoples.
All other issues in this affair are realpolitik.
#14 - I don't favor cheering or rooting for one side or another in this conflict, but there is a big difference between lauding Putin and giving Georgia a billion dollars in military aid, which the Bush regime has done, transporting Georgian troops, which it has also done, and trying to get Georgia admitted to NATO which it is still working on. The neo-cons didn't just laud Saakashvili, their NGOs put him in power, their aid including military "advisors" helps keep him in power. To equate this vast amount of material aid to the Georgian regime with people on the other side simply stating that Russia is in the right is a bit unbalanced to say the least.
To write that the Russians "had planned the Georgian intervention ahead of time" suggests that, to paraphrase the near-hysterical report released shortly after the Georgian invasion by The Economist, "this was a plot hatched by Moscow." It does appear that Russia had a plan in place to respond in the event of a Georgian attack; they would have been negligent not to, and we should be grateful they did (the South Ossetians certainly are). For the Georgians did indeed attack South Ossetia (to call it a "move into South Ossetia" is to engage in Newspeak) and in sudden, brutal and treacherous fashion (http://antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13304). Unlike the West, the Russians appear to have been paying attention to what Saakashvili had been saying openly since at least last year, namely that he would retake the breakaway provinces in a matter of "weeks or months." (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16489 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16474) Just two weeks before Saakashvili invaded, my son spoke to his host family mother in Tbilisi on the phone. She told him excitedly, "We'll go to Abkhazia together, when you come back to Georgia!" "What is he [Saakashvili] telling them?! Don't they understand this means war with Russia?" said my son when he put down the phone. Saakashvili's intention to act soon and decisively was no secret in Georgia. There was nothing murky about it. As for the border incidents, Mr. Allensworth appears to have bought the theory that these were all part of a Russian plot, but please consider the very likely alternative explanation that Saakashvili and his people often were the provocateurs. There is solid evidence suggesting tha at least one such major border incident recently was staged by the Georgians (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18611&search=zugdidi).
Mr. Allensworth,
Thanks for the insightful column. If you can, it would be interesting to see a more comprehensive analysis of Russian political dynamics (i.e., in the Medvedev/Putin circle.)
Also, what do you think of the claims made by Russia critics that Putin exerted his authority in this matter, at one point "ordering" Medvedev regarding the actions to be taken? (I'm a bit dubious of that conclusion which is drawn from observers of an exchange between the two. But a PM is presumably selected for his ability in administration, including in security affairs, and you'd expect Putin to give his views to Medvedev.) Has Putin stepped aside or are they a "two for one" to quote our ex-President of his wife?
I appreciate the skepticism of Russian and Putin's actions as well as the skepticism of our machinations with Saakashvili. (Who, at the least, has proven himself incompetent and of bad judgment in this matter.)
Hi, I am just wondering if my comment could be moderated. Is comment moderation universal, or have I been selected for it?
Forgot the word "please." Here is my comment, again:
@15: Your presentation of the region’s history is tendentious. The Ossetians originally lived in Russia. In the Middle Ages, they migrated to Samachablo, a Georgian principality, in order to escape the Mongols. Samachablo is now South Ossetia. So South Ossetia originally belonged to the Kingdom of Georgia. Then Russia annexed South Ossetia *together with the rest of Georgia* in 1801. So it is true that South Ossetia once belonged to Russia, but only at the time when *all of Georgia* belonged to Russia.
You mentioned Stalin. It sounds very ominous to say that South Ossetia was only joined to Georgia by one of the worst Communist dictators ever, a man who was Georgian himself. BUT — as I pointed out above, South Ossetia belonged to Georgia for centuries prior to the Russian conquest of Georgia. Secondly, Stalin’s father was Ossetian, his mother Georgian. Third, the first modern Ossetian movement for autonomy was tainted by Bolshevism. At the time, Georgia was an independent Menshevik republic and the Ossetians sought to join the Bolshevik USSR (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian-Ossetian_conflict_(1918-1920). When the Bolsheviks ultimately conquered Georgia and united South Ossetia to it, it was in fact a re-unification, as South Ossetia was Georgian territory to begin with.
So the Ossetians are immigrants, although they’ve been in Samachablo/South Ossetia for centuries (just as Albanians have been in Kosovo for centuries). Secondly, the Ossetians have decided to ignore historic Georgian claims on the territory, just as the Albanians have decided to ignore historic Serbian claims on Kosovo. Thirdly, if the situation in Abkhazia is a precedent, then there is the chance that the Georgians of South Ossetia could be ethnically cleansed — (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing_of_Georgians_in_Abkhazia). Now, the Georgians don’t have clean hands as far as mistreatment of Ossetians goes — neither do the Serbs have clean hands vis-a-vis Moslems in Serbia. But the fact remains, the Georgians are “guilty” only of “invading” their own country.
@16: Imbalance? I care more for what paleocons say and think than for what neocons say and think. Therefore, an error made by paleocons is of greater concern to me than one made by neocons.
You compare the gravity of paleoconservative and neoconservative errors in terms of the two groups’ relative abilities to enact their desires. I.e. paleocons write on blogs, neocons set up NGOs and rattle actual sabers. But this comparison does not actually speak to the gravity of errors in se. It is only when a policy is effected to some degree that its worth is revealed. Of course neocons’ errors “look bigger” — they’re the ones in power. The paleocons’ never get to test their ideas by implementing them and so we’ll never know just how good they actually are. I think that Buchanan and other paleoconservatives have gotten it wrong when they “root” for Putin, even if all they do is root ineffectually. And as long as paleocons take these mistaken positions, I hope that they never come to power, regardless of what I think of neocons.
Hi, again. I hate to be a squeaky wheel, but it seems that my comment should have been moderated -- either accepted or rejected -- by now. My apologies for asking again, but I would like to respond to the posters who were kind enough to engage my arguments. Thanks.
#18
Putin is the more influential of the two at this juncture. There are factions in and around the Kremlin and government who would like to undermine Medvedev and have Putin remain as the key figure. They fear some of Medvedev's backers. Some factions want Medvedev to assert his independence and carry out the "thaw" I mentioned above.
I think that as the crisis developed, Putin gave Medvedev room to be presidential and work out a cease fire, as Putin does not wish the "siloviky" faction to become too strong and limit his future options. War naturally gives the "power" faction more influence. The members of the tandem have worked out an informal divison of powers between themselves, I think. I do not detect any significant gap between them on the South Ossetia crisis just now, but the factions will try and play them against one another, as they did in the recent mini-crisis over the Mechel company (Too complicated to go into here, I think you could probably find some English material on this).
The clan battle at present is over that future--the siloviky could push for formal amendments to the constitution and make Russia a parliamentary republic, undermining the presidency and any chance of Medvedev's backers to convince him to move against the siloviky in a direct way. Or if Medvedev falters, then Putin might be pressured to return in 2012--or earlier, with Medvedev leaving office early. Another option is for Putin and Medvedev to continue as a tandem, with Medvedev gradually gaining political weight and Putin leaving the cabinet at some point. He could maintain his influence as head of the ruling party, United Russia. I think some factions would prefer that Putin leave the scene sooner rather than later, weakening the protection he can provide the siloviky. They appear to have another candidate for premier, Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin.
Putin's objective is protect himself and his family, as well as a few close associates. How secure he feels will help determine which course of action he might favor, thus the efforts to drive a wedge between him and Medvedev--some of his siloviky comrades are likely telling him he would not be safe if Medvedev is too strong, since a "thaw" could target him as well. But a war with worsening relations with the West could do the same. The other side is already playing up stories of the siloviky plotting to use the war to gain more influence. In these games, it is sometimes enough to simply plant the seed of doubt to cause trouble.
That is a very brief and, I'm afraid, much simplified version of events. A "for instance"--there are a number of "power department" types who are close to Medvedev, while Putin is close to a number of "liberals," so the kind of simplified team lineups we often hear are a bit misleading.
Also--the exchange you mention--could it be the meeting between Medvedev and Putin after VVP returned to Moscow from Vladikavkaz (North Osseiya; he went there from Beijing)? Putin brought up pressing war crimes charges and said he thought Medvedev should assign Military Prosecutor Fridinskiy to investigate--at first, I thought VVP might be playing up his role, perhaps under the influence of some of his siloviky friends or perhaps fallout from the Mechel affair, but on closer examination, I think he was trying to help Medvedev. I think Fridinskiy is associated with a faction that is friendly to Medvedev, while the siloviky ally Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee, was brought into the war crimes story as well--the name of the game is "balance" and preventing one side from gaining too much influence. The siloviky might use the investigation to their advantage in some way--Putin may have been making it clear to them that he wanted Medvedev's man involved as well.
Power ebbs and flows in Russia and the games never stop.
#21 - The only desire that paleos seem to have is for the US not to intervene in distant wars that don't concern the US and certainly for the US to abandon its global imperialist designs. If you don't want to see these policies implemented and and think these ideas mistaken, that must mean that you favor a policy of foreign wars and interventions, so I can understand your relative sympathy for the neo-cons. You are basically one of them. And the neo-cons don't just rattle sabers, they wield them and right heartily. Sorry that you consider war so desirable and peace such a threat.
#21 - I was quite aware of the fact that the Ossetians migrated from Russia. However, since they have been in Ossetia since the Middle Ages, they should be considered native to the soil. They have been there longer than whites have been in the U.S. My statement was not tendentious.
The fact that the land was part of Georgia before that is a matter of ancient history and not very relevant, though it would be interesting to know if Georgians or someone else lived there before the Ossetians arrived. Considering the nature of the land, I suspect that whoever lived there, they were sparsely settled.
You seem to be suggesting that by mentioning Stalin, I'm resorting to some kind of emotional bogey man conjuring. That is more of an accusation of dishonesty than anything else.
South Ossetia was part of Russia at one time and separate from Georgia, and it was Stalin who gave it to Georgia, regardless of whether the Georgians ruled it before the Soviet or Czarist eras. I used to have a map of the Caucasus and Anatolia printed in the early 1920's, and it clearly showed South Ossetia as part of Russia.
Stalin's parentage is irrelevant to the issue, as is the alleged Bolshevism of the original separatist movement. That's akin to condemning the original Scottish National party for being leftist, without understanding that at the the time, leftism was a means of resisting state control from London. Likewise, the Ossetians wanted to join Russia, which was Bolshevist, so they adopted a Bolshevist facade to gain approval from Moscow. All this only proves how complicated politics can be. By pointing out this Bolshevism of the early Ossetian movement, you yourself are engaging in emotional bogey man conjuring without intending to really understand what was going on.
"They have been there longer than whites have been in the U.S."
If the standard is how long whites have been in the United States, then Albanians are native to Kosovo.
I don't think the South Ossetian authorities are as brutish as the repackaged KLA.
When suggesting hypocrisy, one can point to the neo-libs and neo-cons who support Kosovo's independence, but not that of others.
Russia doesn't recognize any of the disputed territories as independent states. BTW, Turkey recognizes the so called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" as an independent state.
Regarding the obvious about Felgenhauer, Socor and their politically like minded kin on the Russian counterattack:
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-151-12.cfm
Mr. Allensworth @ 23,
A very helpful analysis (even if you qualify it as brief.) Perhaps you could consider a lengthier such analysis for an article in Chronicles? (Whether in the popular media or even in magazines like Chronicles and the American Conservative, I have not seen an independent conservative analysis of the political dynamics in the Kremlin. The vast majority are the typically hostile caricatures or a critique of those caricatures. And an embarrassingly obsequious profile of Putin by John Laughland in TAC.)
Regards
Thank you, Mr. Wilson, for your comments above. You claim that the original backers of autonomy for South Ossetia adopted Bolshevism merely as a facade in order to join Russia. You would need to study the backgrounds of all the persons involved in order to determine whether your claim is true. Maybe "Bolshevism" for them merely meant joining Russia -- or maybe they really were Bolsheviks. You don't present any evidence for your claim. The source I read claimed that the autonomy movement was quickly *taken over* by Bolshevik members after its foundation, which suggests that the Bolsheviks involved were true Communist ideologues.
As to the relevance of Stalin's ancestry: I address more than just your own particular claims. I have read commentators on the internet who have written things like "Stalin, *himself a Georgian.*" Of course, you cited Stalin as the one responsible for South Ossetian union with Georgia because you regard this as relevant. Probably you meant that the union came so late in time, which I have shown is false. Secondly, others (not you) might find it relevant that the hated Communists were responsible for joining South Ossetia to Georgia -- I have seen other commentators speak of the legacy of the Soviet Union, etc. I decided to kill numerous birds with one stone (one post) when replying to you. I wanted to strike down false conclusions that people other than you might draw from Stalin's involvement.
You mention political confusion. Among other things, I myself was trying to show how complicated things were. It is not just that Stalin re-united South Ossetia to Russia, but that South Ossetians rebels adopted Bolshevism when they first fought Georgia. As for emotionalism, much of these arguments *do* come down to emotional attachment. You speak as though the Georgians have no legitimate claim to the soil there. Well, apparently the first time the Ossetians of Samachablo rebelled in favor of the Russians, the Russians were Bolsheviks. Surely that helps explain why patriotic Georgians would be displeased with Ossetian separatism. Fighting the Russians to keep part of their country is not unlike fighting the Bolsheviks to keep them out of Georgia. (By analogy, the Albanians of Kosovo are not just of a different nationality, but in the proponderance of cases of a different religion. This renders the situation much more volatile than it otherwise would be -- to say the least!)
Mr. Higdon: I can understand how you might think I favor neoconservatism. Please read Mr. Wilson's posts. If he claims to be a paleoconservative, then we have an instance of a paleconservative who would like to take sides here, at least in sympathies. I don't want to go to war over Georgia, no. I also think that the Georgian president was at the very best extremely imprudent in what he did. But many paleocons go much further than this, basically to endorse Putin and his intervention on sovereign Georgian territory. To the extent that some paleocons (extra stress on *some*) judge the matter, Georgians *must* be evil for trying to retrieve what *clearly* belongs to *Holy Mother Russia.* This is more than reaction to Russophobia (a word thrown about by people who don't have to live on the periphery of the Bear), it is unwarranted Russophilia. Buchanan routinely exonerates Putin of every and any less than noble motive. Case in point, his arguments about that journalist killed by radiation poisoning were extemely weak. There is a reactive anti-American, anti-Western sentiment that goes beyond mere desires for non-interventionism into vilification of the local populations who might dare to challenge Russia. Not every criticism of Russia is Russophobia, not every opposition to Russia is a neoconservative con job. I can see the neoconservative, Zionist involvement with Saakashvili. The paleocons do an excellent job of demonstrating this. But at the end of the day, if we adopt the principles evinced in support of Serbian claims to Kosovo, then South Ossetia belongs to Georgia. At least it seems to me that a strong case can be made for this (I don't know the extent of Georgian atrocities that might have rendered their claims on the region nil, just as I don't know the true extent of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo that might have vitiated their own claims).
Re: emotionalism. Some commentators have noted that South Ossetia is rugged territory. Mr. Wilson speculates as to the level the Georgians ever populated the territory. That the Georgians would fight for rugged, inhospitable territory may show that the neocons are trying to pit them against Russia. Or it may show that they care more for historic claims -- Georgian territory is Georgian territory, no matter how inhospitable, no matter what superpower occupies it. That sounds like a paleoconservative sentiment.
In any case, 30% of the population of South Ossetia is still Georgian (http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761584377/south_ossetia.html), vs. 65% Ossetian. So it is not just "ancient history" -- the ancient owners still live there. If I recall correctly, the percentage of Serbs in Kosovo is *much* smaller than the percentage of Georgians in South Ossetia.
Now, I'd have to study the matter. The Georgians seem to have mistreated the Ossetians by not respecting their autonomy and native tongue. That certainly helps explain why the Ossetians have turned to Russia. Just ask yourself whether that argument justifies every secession that might be justified on similar grounds.
For American interests, it is the question of the relation to Russia that is of greater import, not the relation to Georgia. That is the fate of small countries.
And this note from today NYT should not be overlooked. It regards a recent debt issuance by Freddie Mac:
The Russian finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, told reporters in Moscow on Tuesday that Russia was still buying debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but on a smaller scale.
Just as our unnecessary pursuit of hegemony has made us vulnerable through entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan (and increasingly Georgia), so too our unwise economic policy has made us vulnerable to foreign influence.
I agree with Tobias about the need not to adopt a sympathy in favor of Russia in order to rebut propaganda from elements who wish to provoke conflict with Russia in the pursuit of hegemonic position. There are unquestionably interests the US has which conflict with Russia as well as those which may coincide with Russia's. It is also unnecessary for us (as our President did) adopt a sentimentalistic view of the ruling class in Russia which, as Mr. Allensworth pointed out, is continually shifting and certainly has a propensity from corruption and violence. (If paleocons embrace KGB agents we have surely lost our senses, even though we should legitimately demand a rational approach to Russia policy.)
As for the history of South Ossetia, except as necessary to understand the motives of the actors, I don't think it relevant to the formation of US policy on US interests.
"is not just that Stalin re-united South Ossetia to Russia"
Change "Russia" to "Georgia."
Here is an interesting article. Apparently Otto von Hapsburg (a neoconspirator?) supports Saakashvili -- and likes Charleston, S.C.:
http://www.charlestonmercury.com/articles/2008/08/12/news/doc488f51c00f823182575839.txt
Tobias: Everyone here knows that the history and ethnic situation in Ossetia are complex. I dont have time to go into minute detail about population percentages or whatever, or get into insult matches. What the Georgians were doing was clearly wrong and was egged on by neocons in Foggy Bottom.
Perhaps you have made some valid points concerning historical matters, though most are quite irrelevant as to the immediate, here and now causes of the conflict. Then you suggest to Mr Higdon that I wish to take sides against Georgia. There you go again. You have tried to make me look like some kind of partisan, and I am not. Georgia is an ancient nation with a wonderful culture, and I am certainly not anti-Georgian. My intention in posting here was to learn more about the situation and exchange valid points, but it was not to be arrogantly insulted by someone who accuses me of partisanship where I have none, accuses me of dishonest emotional manipulation, and misrepresents me and myself to others. Do not put words into my mouth, and do not misrepresent my intentions.
If you wish to discuss the Caucasian troubles, stick to respectful exchange and honest, respectful disagreement, or admit that you are worthy of neither.
From today's BBC report:
"Russia has issued new, reduced casualty figures for the Georgian conflict, with 133 civilians now listed as dead in the disputed region of South Ossetia.
The figure is far lower than the 1,600 people Russia initially said had died.
Prosecutors say they have opened a case against Georgia for genocide, while Tbilisi has already filed charges of ethnic cleansing against Moscow. "
Tobias:
"That the Georgians would fight for rugged, inhospitable territory"
They won't even fight for Tbilisi, showing how useless they are as "allies".
They're good at fighting villagers, but after a decade of US and Israeli training, with massive arming from Ukraine, the US etc., their almost 30,000 man army (plus 4,000,000+ citizens) ran away from 10,000 Russian troops.
Pathetic.
Or perhaps they saw no reason to fight for South Ossetia.
I guess if there was an election today. then Suckassfeelie would get less than 5% of the vote.
It seems that many Georgians are less bothered about the Russian presence than Hot Air and NRO and the talk radio windbags are.
Re: "Prosecutors say they have opened a case against Georgia for genocide, while Tbilisi has already filed charges of ethnic cleansing against Moscow"
Let them argue. I has sweet FA to do with Spain or any other NATO member.
If the US wants to go to war war with Russia, go to it. NATO members are obliged to joint defense, not offense.
If the US wants to go to war war with Russia, go to it. NATO members are obliged to joint defense, not offense.
I guess you've never heard the American saying about "the best defense"?
If there's one thing we seem to be good at, it's being offensive.
Mr. Wilson wrote: "Russia and plaeocons are right to support the Serbs with regard to Kosovo, and ‘paleocons’ would be right to support Russia in preventing the invasion, and if it was taking place, the ethnic cleansing of South Ossetia by Georgia."
So Mr. Wilson said that paleocons would be right to support Russia in this conflict. I would call this "taking sides." I took his comment to be more than hypothetical, but perhaps it was just hypothetical. If the latter was the case, I apologize, but can you see how I could make such a mistake? I subsequently typified his comment thus: "Please read Mr. Wilson’s posts. If he claims to be a paleoconservative, then we have an instance of a paleconservative who would like to take sides here, at least in sympathies." At the very least, Mr. Wilson said that paleocons would be right to support Russia. That goes beyond Mr. Higdon's "none of our business" line. Perhaps "none of our business" is Mr. Wilson's own position, but that's not what he said. He defended paleocons siding with Russia.
Subsequently Mr. Wilson wrote: "Then you suggest to Mr Higdon that I wish to take sides against Georgia. There you go again. You have tried to make me look like some kind of partisan, and I am not. Georgia is an ancient nation with a wonderful culture, and I am certainly not anti-Georgian. My intention in posting here was to learn more about the situation and exchange valid points, but it was not to be arrogantly insulted by someone who accuses me of partisanship where I have none, accuses me of dishonest emotional manipulation, and misrepresents me and myself to others. Do not put words into my mouth, and do not misrepresent my intentions."
You say that paleocons would be right to support Russia. You did not balance this with a statement that paleocons might also be right to support Georgia. I interpreted this as partisanship, which is not a forced interpretation as far as I can see. I explained above that when I addressed emotionalism, I was trying to debunk emotionalism I have read in posts other than Mr. Wilson's. I now add an apology -- I should have stipulated in my original post that I did not detect such emotionalism in your own post. But claims about Stalin often bear emotional baggage, so I wanted to strike down any attempt that *a reader* might have to "read between the lines" (even if you didn't write anything there, Mr. Wilson). So I apologize for not making that stipulation to begin with. In any case, as I showed, Stalin was not the first person to unite South Ossetia with Georgia.
You claim now that you do not wish to get into percentages. Yet earlier you claimed that the South Ossetians should be acknowledged as the current native population and that Georgian ownership is "ancient history." It clearly is not ancient history, as almost a third of the current population is ethnically Georgian. You made claims, and I rebutted them, and in my opinion successfully, if I must say so. All of this was in order to defend the Kosovo/Ossetia analogy, which I was first to advance and which you then critiqued. So I was rebutting your critique. If your critique fails, I don't see how I am being "insulting" when I point this out. I apologize for the offense.
I repeat, I made claims about writers *other than Mr. Wilson* as well as claims about Mr. Wilson. Please, if I do not say "here I am referring to Mr. Wilson," do not infer that he is the person I am criticizing.
Akira: "They’re good at fighting villagers, but after a decade of US and Israeli training, with massive arming from Ukraine, the US etc., their almost 30,000 man army (plus 4,000,000+ citizens) ran away from 10,000 Russian troops."
A decade? Are you moving forward Saakashvili's rise to power to *1998*?. Please check your facts.
"10,000 Russian troops" -- the key word is *Russian.* And if the 30,000 Georgians were to defeat the 10,000 Russians, there were going to be 10,000 more Russians there shortly, followed by another 10,000, etc., etc. Because Russia is much, much larger than Georgia and has many more than 4,000,000+ citizens. As it is, Georgia lives to fight another day, if they so choose.
Tobias, if my posts seemed to imply that plaeocons necessarily would be wrong to support Georgia, that was not my intention. I also didn't mean to say that there were no Georgians in Ossetia. I was replying to what looked to me like accusations of hypocrisy which were unwarranted. As far as I knew, the Ossetians weren't doing anything like what was being done by Albanians in Kosovo, and since they had lived there for centuries, they should be considered native and certainly should not be ethnically cleansed. If that is what was going on, then Russia was right to intervene, since the Ossetians are Russian citizens, and to make such a statement is not necessarily partisanship. Getting into ancient history and statistical details is time consuming and unnecessary in this regard. Such historical concerns are entangling and probably inextricable.
As for secession, if ethnic cleansing was going on, then certainly the Ossetians are justified in seeking separation from Georgia, though the Georgian population of Ossetia makes in rather complicated. That is why the U.S. needs to mind it's own business.
Contrast this with Kosovo, where there was a brutal ethnic cleansing by Albanians who came in as immigrants, even if many had been there for a long time. If we were to do as some Albanians do, and base land claims on the possibility that ancient Illyrians might have occupied what is now Kosovo way back when, before movements of peoples changed ethnic arrangements in the Balkans, that would only make things, once again, inextricably tangled.
The claim that the Serbs were ethnically cleansing Albanians has been debated, I dont think they were, and they had every right to stop ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo, including military invasion, and if that were the case, the U.S. was wrong to intervene.
In any case there appears to have been more than a little misunderstanding between us and I do not wish for that to continue. Suffice it to say that the U.S. needs to stay out of both conflicts, and if it had done so, much of the evil that has taken place would not have happened. That was the whole, though obviously not mentioned, rationale underlying my argument. When we make internet posts, we often dont word things the way we should, or leave things out, and misunderstanding often ensues especially when we dont have time to consider the effect of what we have just written.
I really dont care who controls South Ossetia in the long run, and I am dismayed that Georgia, surrounded by powerful Muslim states which one day may conquer Georgia once again, has now been alienated from the one major European power which is capable of helping Georgia against them and which is close enough to do so. They made a big mistake, though an understandable one, in allying with the U.S. and it's aims at encircling Russia and controlling resources.